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Abstract 
Term limits are an often-debated reform proposal in American politics. In the 1990s and 
2000s, many states adopted a range of term limit policies, including Nebraska. At the time, many 
bold predictions were made for how such a significant structural change in state governance 
might affect political norms. Over the past 20 to 30 years, many empirical studies have been 
carried out to weigh the merits of these predictions. However, much research has focused on 
institutional effects within state legislatures themselves; less focus has been given to the residual 
effects on voters themselves. 
This paper posits the argument that term limits can influence voter turnout through at least 
two mechanisms: an increase in political polarization and an increase in electoral competition, 
both of which may promote greater citizen participation. Here, I examine electoral competition 
in Nebraska since 1980 through a number of measures and find that term limits may indeed have 
contributed to greater competition after their implementation in Nebraska, at least in a reduction 
in margins of victory. Along the way, I outline the history of term limits, catalogue existing 
research on their effects, and develop a novel theory to describe how political polarization 
operates in the United States. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“Atop the 400 foot tower of the Nebraska State Capitol stands a figure casting the seeds of life to 
the winds....the Sower.” 
-Nebraska State Capitol Website 
In many ways, the business that happens 400 feet directly beneath the Sower, a 19-foot-
tall bronze statue representing Nebraska’s agricultural heritage (“Lee Lawrie” 2019), casts the 
norms of American state legislative politics to the winds. The Nebraska State Legislature is the 
only non-partisan, unicameral legislature in the United States, a fact ingrained in the identity of a 
Cornhusker—in 2020, the Lincoln Journal Star, Nebraska’s second-largest newspaper, called 
Nebraska’s unicameralism one of the 10 things Nebraskans can be proud of; it made the list 
along with national figures, college football national championships, and the “world class” 
Henry Doorly Zoo in Omaha (“10 Times” 2020). Every four years, Nebraska’s presidential 
electors gather in the capitol’s legislative chamber to cast their votes for president—with several 
allocated by congressional district, a practice only elsewhere observed in the state of Maine. And 
since 2000, Nebraska has been one of a handful of states with term limits for its state legislators. 
Nebraska’s implementation of legislative term limits, which came into effect in 2006, 
was a part of the broader pro-term limits movement of the 1990s; Nebraska initially passed term 
limits in 1992, but they were thrown out by the Nebraska Supreme Court until being successfully 
passed “after several other attempts” once more in 2000, coming into effect in 2006 (Masket and 
Shor 2015, 72). This “had a dramatic effect on the chamber’s composition,” with the percentage 
of freshmen in 2006 up more than 35%; by 2009, “only 12 of the chamber’s 49 senators had 
been in the chamber four years earlier” (73). 
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The movement of the 1990s saw attempts by 21 states to implement term limits for their 
state legislatures in what Mooney (2009) calls an “exceptionally swift reform movement” (see 
Table 1); between 1990 and 1991, 43 states considered some form of term limit action (Moncrief 
et al. 1992, 37). Scholars generally cite decades of slowing legislative turnover preceding the 
1990s, documented by Shin and Jackson (1979) and Niemi and Winsky (1987), as the main 
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catalyst for the sudden seismic shift in electoral practice (Moncrief et al. 1992, 38; Mooney 
2009, 205-206), but Mooney goes farther to argue that the cause is rooted: 
in the distinctive environment of public dissatisfaction with high reelection rates for members of 
Congress, unease with a few long-serving state legislative leaders, a couple of well-heeled policy 
entrepreneurs looking for a cause, the renewed popularity of the direct initiative, old-fashioned 
Jeffersonian distrust of politicians, and the good timing of a Libertarian political operative named 
Paul Jacob. 
Moncrief et al. (1992, 45) show that turnover in state upper chambers had dropped from 25% to 
18% and from 30% to 20% in lower chambers between 1980 and 1988. 
 Despite the accelerating interest in them during the 1990s, term limits are novel in neither 
the American experiment specifically nor civilization generally. Aristotle advocated for term 
limits, and the Athenian boule practiced them (Kousser 2008, 117). In 1639, the Fundamental 
Orders of Connecticut provided “that no person be chosen Governor above once in two years” 
(“Fundamental Orders” 2008). The Articles of Confederation provided for term limits, with 
legislators being ineligible “to serve no more than three years in six,” and Pennsylvania limited 
legislative terms in its upper house, from which the state chief executive was chosen, until the 
state instituted a popularly elected chief executive in 1790 (Grofman 2012, 14). Even delegates 
to the Continental Congress could serve only a maximum of three years (Fund 1990, 2). The 
movement of the 1990s was “long preceded” by term limits for governors and city councils 
(Luttbeg 2003, 75), and “no level of government or office seems to be immune” from term limit 
efforts (Moncrief et al. 1992, 37). Of course, the 22nd Amendment was ratified in 1951 to limit 
presidents to two terms after Franklin D. Roosevelt’s election to a precedent-shattering fourth 
term in 1944 (NCC Staff 2020). John Fund (1990, 2), who, in 1990, was a pro-term limit 
editorial writer for the Wall Street Journal, wrote for CATO that “term limits for Congress have 
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been endorsed by the likes of Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Harry Truman, Dwight 
Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy.” 
The 1990s movement also saw attempts by states to implement term limits for U.S. 
congresspeople, but the United States Supreme Court overruled those efforts as an 
unconstitutional violation of the qualifications clause in 1995’s U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton (Reporter 1995); prior to the 90s, the United States Congress had considered proposals 
to limit congressional terms in 1789, 1945, 1947, and 1978 (United States 1995), but “the office 
which appears to be most often targeted is that of the state legislator” (Moncrief et al. 1992, 37). 
By February 2006, more than 1,300 state legislators had been termed out of office (Carey et al. 
2006, 106). That number has certainly increased in the 15 years since. 
As one might imagine, such a sudden and transformational moment in American politics 
was accompanied by wide-ranging opinion and commentary, as well as bold predictions. Cain 
(1996, 22) observed that “the most remarkable feature of the term limit debate is that almost 
every prediction in one direction is matched with an equally confident prediction in the opposite 
direction.” Mitchell (1991, 5) sums up the sentiment underlying many of the arguments made by 
term limit advocates: 
What we have now is a system in which members of Congress are like the non-custodial parent in 
a divorced family: they visit on weekends, they come to see us on holidays, and they send money. 
But they don't live with us, and over time they become mere acquaintances rather than people 
who really know their constituents. 
In short, the argument in favor of term limits went like this: the increased legislative turnover 
resulting from term limits (Moncrief et al. 2004, 359) would yield reduced partisan conflict, 
greater compromise and cooperation, better representation (Olson and Rogowski 2020, 572) 
through less focus on reelection efforts (yet, paradoxically, also a greater emphasis on broader 
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interests beyond representatives’ individual districts) (Carey et al. 2006, 107), more electoral 
competition and voter interest (Rausch 1998, 42; Fund 1990, 12-13), reduced risk-aversion 
among legislators and greater legislative creativity (Carey et al. 2006, 107), and even a simmered 
“culture of ruling,” where legislators would pass fewer laws and seek to codify fewer personal 
interests as rules for the masses (Fund 1990, 12-13). 
 On the other hand, opponents of term limit measures cited the very legislative turnover 
that proponents admired as cause for reservation due to diminished institutional knowledge 
(Polsby 1993; Hibbing 1991, 180), which Luce (1924, 358) called “an evil…[in which] may be 
found one of the great causes for the weaknesses of our legislative bodies.” Here, Polsby (1993, 
103-105) summarizes the sentiment: 
Any organization, Congress included, that does serious business, needs some members to provide 
experience, continuity, and institutional memory. It does not seem entirely unreasonable that 
twenty of the 435 members of the House of Representatives who voted on the Persian Gulf 
resolution in 1991 were also present in the House to vote on the Tonkin Gulf resolution twenty-
seven years earlier. … Experience helps in the acquisition of knowledge. Knowledge is necessary 
to have influence in a complex system, where measures require technical mastery. Legislation is 
complicated. Public policy requires knowledge. Influence over public policy requires knowledge, 
technical understanding, and experience. The fact that some members never acquire this 
knowledge is no argument for requiring that none ever should. 
Further, as the argument goes, diminished institutional expertise would result in greater reliance 
on bureaucracies, staff, lobbyists, and interest groups, all of which stick around as elected 
legislators rotate in and out, damming the swamp that term limits claim to drain (Polsby 1993, 
105-106; Carey et al. 2006, 108). Finally, Polsby (1993, 105) insinuates that term limits would 
inhibit democracy by prohibiting constituents from reelecting legislators who members of the 
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public feel are being sufficiently representative. Fund (1990, 5-12) provides an organized 
response to the most common concerns cited by term limits opponents. 
In the 1990s, as state after state adopted term limits, many scholars sought to chart out the 
predictions of both sides. The speed at which the measures were adopted left little time for initial 
states to serve as “laboratories of democracy” (Reporter 1932), unlike the pro-marijuana 
movement of the 21st century, where laws have been adopted in stages—decriminalization, 
legalization of medical use, and legalization of recreational use—by small waves of states at a 
time. The speculative academic predictions generally, although not exclusively, lended support 
to the opposition (Moncrief et al. 1992, 38). 
A popular predictive academic tool was to use historical legislative turnover to determine 
the effects term limits would have had on removing officials had limits been instituted a decade 
or two prior. Because the range of measures implemented varied state to state (see Table 1), 
those studies came to a range of conclusions. Moncrief et al. (1992, 42) found after analyzing 
historical turnover rates that lower chambers in state houses tended to have a six-year half life, 
with only 50% of members remaining after six years, 25% remaining after 12 years, 12.5% 
remaining after 18 years, and so on; the six-year phenomenon was more of a “third life” in upper 
chambers. Studying this pattern under the hypothetical conditions of a 12-year term limit, the 
researchers found that term limits would only affect about 30% of state legislators; this would 
disproportionately affect legislative leaders, though, as over half tended to have more served 
more than 12 years, resulting in reduced “legislative expertise and experience" (Moncrief et al. 
1992, 44). On the other hand, Opheim (1994) replicated the 1992 Moncrief study under the 
condition of an eight-year limit and found that over half of state legislators would be affected. 
Both studies found different results among legislatures based on their degree of 
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professionalization; historical retention rates were higher the more professional the body. A 
model by Francis and Kenny (1997, 247) predicted term limits would result in oscillating 
turnover rates that would eventually converge to “the equilibrium exit rate” that existed before 
implementation, but would nevertheless leave term-limited legislatures “loaded with 
inexperience” (251). Other studies “suggested that the potential consequences of term limits 
[would] include electoral effects, policy making and representation effects, and effects on the 
power and independence of the legislature” (Moncrief and Thompson 2001, 395). 
Ultimately, despite such predictions, many states forged ahead and instituted term limits. 
Decades onward, much research has been conducted on the effects of term limits as empirical 
evidence gathered over years of their practice has made it possible to show actual outcomes 
rather than mere predictions; most of this research has centered on state legislatures (Nalder 
2007, 187). Of course, this makes sense, as the study of legislative bodies provides many more 
data points than would studying term-limited governors, for example. Further, the most likely 
alternative—the U.S. Congress—became moot as a potential research subject after the U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. ruling. As outlined below, term limits have been shown to have many impacts on the 
status quo of state legislatures. Now, though, it is time to adjust the focus of term limits research 
from the relatively well understood effects on state governments themselves to the residual 
effects on other components of the political system, including members of the general citizenry. 
Some research has been conducted to test proponents’ claims that term limits promote political 
participation, but mixed conclusions show more needs to be done to understand the effects. 
That is the question I explore here using Nebraska as a case study. Specifically, I seek to 
answer how legislative term limits affected voter behavior after being implemented in Nebraska. 
Nebraska makes for an interesting analysis, particularly one as a function of political 
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polarization, due to the state’s unique status as the only non-partisan, unicameral legislature in 
the United States. The Unicameral has been officially nonpartisan since 1937, and only 
Minnesota has also experimented with nonpartisanship between 1913 and 1937 (Masket and 
Shor 2015, 69). Masket and Shor (2015, 70) extensively summarize how Nebraska’s 
nonpartisanship operates in the Unicameral: 
Under state laws, the nonpartisan system affects every aspect of legislative business. There is no 
official majority or minority caucus in the legislature (known popularly as the Unicam), nor are 
there whips or party leaders. The Speaker is elected by his colleagues through a secret ballot, as 
are the chairs of all the standing committees. The 49 senators are elected to staggered four-year 
terms via nonpartisan ballot. The primary election is an open, blanket contest, with all eligible 
candidates for a legislative seat appearing on every ballot regardless of the voters’ or candidates’ 
party registrations. The ballots are constitutionally forbidden from containing information about 
the state legislative candidates’ affiliations with political parties. The top two winners of the 
primary go onto a similarly nonpartisan November runoff election, even if they are registered 
with the same political party. 
While at least one study has “found that the establishment of nonpartisanship in 1937 led to an 
enduring decline in legislative partisanship,” and while “such institutional rules certainly do not 
favor partisan behavior among legislators” (70), there has been a sharp increase in polarization in 
the Unicameral (67), as detailed below, since the implementation of term limits. 
This paper proceeds in five further chapters. Chapter 2 explores the current literature on 
term limits, including their documented effects on state legislatures and political institutions. 
Chapter 3 examines existing literature on political polarization and outlines a model to describe 
how polarization operates in the United States. Chapter 4 focuses in on the rationality of voting 
and develops a two-pronged theory to connect term limits and voter turnout through 1) electoral 
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competition and 2) the model of political polarization explored in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 conducts 
several descriptive and statistical analyses of electoral competition as a result of term limits in 
Nebraska and briefly explores how Nebraska’s voter turnout might be affected by Chapter 4’s 
theory. Chapter 6 concludes the paper with a summary of our intellectual journey and a look 
forward to future lines of inquiry. 
 
CHAPTER 2: CONTEMPORARY UNDERSTANDINGS OF TERM LIMITS 
“There is an excess of refinement in the idea of disabling the people to continue in office men 
who had entitled themselves, in their opinion, to approbation and confidence; the advantages of 
which are at best speculative and equivocal, and are overbalanced by disadvantages far more 
certain and decisive.” 
-Federalist No. 72 
As Table 1 indicates, term limit measures vary widely state to state. On a macro level, 
there are two general categories that term limit measures fall within (Benjamin and Malbin 1992; 
Carey et al. 2006, 105): they either impose a lifetime ban of service in a chamber after a set 
number of years, or they require breaks in service after a set number of years but allow for a later 
return. The latter normally facilitates a kind of cycling between chambers or a cycling in and out 
of the legislature. Nebraska does not impose a lifetime ban on service, and the possibility of 
cycling between chambers is obviously not a consideration in a unicameral legislature. However, 
since term limits began impacting Nebraska senators in 2006, several cases of cycling between 
the legislature and private life have emerged. Perhaps the best example is one of Nebraska’s 
most well-known state senators Ernie Chambers, who became the first person to be termed out of 
the Unicameral a second time in 2021 after being the first legislator to return after being term-
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limited once (Stoddard 2020); Chambers served in the legislature for 46 years (ibid.) and 
contended in 2006 as Nebraska term limits came into effect that the measure had been promoted 
to boot him from office (Bauer 2006). Other instances of cycling have emerged as well. 
This variance in style is only one of the many challenges that can inhibit the study of 
term limits (Moncrief and Thompson 2001, 396; Moncrief et al. 2004, 357). Specific 
characteristics of individual states and individual legislatures can impact the generalizability of 
the effects of term limits, including “formal rules and informal traditions and norms of behavior” 
(Moncrief and Thompson 2001, 408) and “policy changes and events concurrent with, but 
independent of, term limits” (396-397). Such independent factors include other changes in 
electoral structure like the implementation of a blanket primary system or campaign finance 
reform, changes in party control of chambers (ibid.) or governorships, and structural changes in 
the operation of the legislative branch (Straayer 2003, 61). Perhaps the most important 
confounding factor, though, as alluded to above, is the degree of professionalization, or the 
“incentives (e.g., financial compensation and staff resources provided) and costs (e.g., money to 
run a competitive campaign and time commitment) of legislative service” (Moncrief and 
Thompson 2001, 396), of the legislature (Everson 1992; Moncrief and Thompson 2001, 406; 
Moncrief et al. 1992; Opheim 1994; Rausch 1998, 52) as “legislative turnover tends to be lower 
and average tenure greater in professional state legislatures than in part-time, citizen legislatures” 
(Moncrief and Thompson 2001, 396). 
 A further complicating factor is that the effects of term limits seem to play out in at least 
two stages. “Both anticipatory effects (when term limits are enacted) and implementation effects 
(when they go into effect) vary” (Moncrief et al. 2004, 358). Much of those anticipatory effects 
relate to a “churning” before term limits take effect, resulting from “early exit by members in 
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anticipation of the turnover deadline” (Moncrief et al. 2004, 361; Francis and Kenney 2000). 
These early departures continue after the implementation of term limits and will be discussed in 
Sections 2.1 and 2.2. Anticipatory effects also manifest in “a burst of legislative creativity as 
long standing members open the floodgates on pending policy initiatives, but legislative policy 
innovations then drop off as term limits replace longstanding incumbents with newcomers” 
(Carey et al. 2006, 105). Petrecca (1996, 11) also found lower incumbency advantages during the 
transitional period of California’s term limit implementation. 
Despite these challenges, researchers have been able to draw a plethora of conclusions 
about the effects of term limits. Mooney (2009, 204-205) catalogs a litany of research where  
term limits have been shown or hypothesized to have an extraordinarily wide range of impacts, 
including effects on candidate decision making; voter turnout; electoral competition and 
campaign finance; partisan outcomes of legislative elections; congressional elections; legislative 
demographics; relationships within the legislature; roll-call voting; legislative committees and 
leadership; bicameralism; public policy; and a legislature’s relationships with lobbyists, the 
executive branch, and its constituents. 
As noted above, most of these impacts relate directly to the state legislature, and researchers 
have categorized the legislative effects of term limits into three key buckets (Carey et al. 2006, 
106-107): compositional effects, which “refers to legislators’ demographic characteristics, 
including their religious and ideological orientations, income levels, and professional 
backgrounds;” behavioral effects, which “refers to the attitudes and priorities of legislators, 
reflected in part by how legislators allocate one of their scarcest resources: their time;” and 
institutional effects, which “refers to the relative influence of various state political actors over 
policy outcomes.” Kousser (2008, 118) frames the categories as three questions: “Who goes to 
state capitols? What goes on in state capitols? What policies come out of state capitols?” Term 
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limits research generally relies on three kinds of data: “objective measures, anecdotal evidence, 
and survey data” (Moncrief and Thompson 2001, 397). 
Just as the speculative academic predictions generally lended support to opponents of 
term limits, so has the empirical evidence gathered since their implementation, including 
findings of unanticipated consequences (Moncrief and Thompson 2001, 395). Kousser (2008, 
117) says “term limits have fundamentally altered the operation of state legislatures without 
much changing the type of lawmakers who serve in them...Term limits have not turned political 
animals into citizen politicians.” Moncrief and Thompson (2001, 403) sum up the effects of term 
limits in three key outcomes: term limits have yielded less informed legislators, ... term-limited 
legislatures have lost influence, … [and] state legislative candidates have been more ideological, 
partisan, and assertive about soliciting campaign contributions.” Carey et al. (2006, 105) find 
similar outcomes. 
2.1 Compositional Effects 
Sometimes implicit and other times explicit in the arguments of proponents of term limits 
was the hope that kicking old timers—often old, relatively well-to-do, white men—out of 
legislatures would open up seats for traditionally underrepresented groups like women, ethnic 
and racial minorities, and people from low socioeconomic status backgrounds. The empirical 
evidence gathered since the 1990s shows none of these hopes have come to fruition, at least as a 
result of term limits. A 2006 survey study based on the responses of 40% of state legislators in 
the United States—2,982 individuals—found “no significant differences between legislators in 
term limit versus non-term-limit states with regard to family income,” reported religious 
affiliation, or age distribution when compared to a similar study in the 1990s (Carey et al. 2006, 
114). The study found a slight increase in the number of racial and ethnic minority and women 
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legislators, but neither increase could be attributed to term limits. In fact, the only significant 
difference—fundamentalism—occurred in legislators from both term limit and non-term-limit 
states. 
Other studies have found similar results (Moncrief and Thompson 2001, 397). Straayer 
(2003) studied the state of Colorado and found no significant advantage of access for women, 
ethnic and racial minorities, or individuals from different age groups or occupational 
backgrounds than typical legislators after term limits in the state were implemented. Kousser 
(2008, 121) found that “minority representation has increased in only a few cases, and women 
have not been helped by term limits anywhere. Caress (1999, 45) suggested that term limits can 
only have a positive influence on the electoral fortunes of women candidates if a conducive 
political environment is present,” but also noted that “if a large number of women are already 
incumbents, the influence of term limits on the aggregate number of women in a legislature can 
be negative.” The latter was echoed by Kousser, who pointed out that term limits put at risk 
“some of the gains in female representation that were won in 1992 (Year of the Woman).” Cain 
and Kousser (2004, 6) find some increases in diversity but attribute little of these advances to 
term limits, with “much of the diversification [resulting] from other trends that term limits 
merely accelerated.” 
While term limits appear to have no or minimal effect on the racial, gender, occupational, 
age, or socioeconomic diversity of legislators, the effect on ideological makeup of legislatures is 
a bit more disputed. The Carey et al. (2006, 114) study found “no evidence at all that term limits 
changed the ideological makeup of legislatures or even of the candidate pool from which they 
were selected,” but it is important to note that that conclusion, as well as all other findings from 
the study, came from self-reported analyses by legislators themselves. A similar study that asked 
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state lobbyists a similar question found that an “overwhelming majority (82.0 percent) of 
respondents felt that term limits resulted in ‘a different kind of person’ running for the 
legislature,” one that is more ideological and partisan, resulting in a “new breed of legislator” 
(Moncrief and Thompson 2001, 402). 
Also intertwined in proponents’ arguments was the notion that career politicians would 
be forced from office (Clark and Williams 2014, 175), promoting an increase in citizen 
legislators. As with the diversity argument, this prediction does not seem to hold. As noted 
above, term limits can promote a sort of cycling in and out of office and among chambers and 
positions rather than remove political actors from the system altogether. After all, politicians are 
rational, strategic actors capable of taking steps to maximize preferred outcomes, including 
holding onto power (Downs 1957; Clark and Williams 2014, 173; Francis 1993, 314, 318; 
Francis and Kenny 1997, 241; Jacobson 1987). 
One study of 26 state legislatures found 47% of termed out legislators between 1996 and 
2008 ran for another public office (Clark and Williams 2014, 178). Straayer (2003, 63) found 
similar results in Colorado, and Kousser (2008, 121) writes that the “overwhelming majority [of 
politicians termed out] plan to run for another elected office, to lobby, or to take an appointive 
office.” Understandably, these politicians would prefer to seek an office or position with greater 
influence than they enjoy in their present role. As expected, Moncrief et al. (2004, 369) find that 
term limits cause “an increase in the number of house members moving to the state senate,” and 
Powell (2000) finds that, “[h]olding the other factors constant, in open-seat races state legislators 
are 6% more likely to run for Congress in states with term limits.” While politicians might prefer 
to seek greater influence, this is not always possible. Politicians serving in an upper chamber 
who face being term limited out may elect to step backward into a lower chamber rather than 
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give up power entirely, especially when the chances of successfully winning a higher seat (e.g., 
in the U.S. Congress), perhaps due to incumbency, are low enough to cause pause in these 
strategic, rational actors (Lazarus 2006; Robeck 1982, 508); empirical data support the notion 
“that term-limited states are experiencing some movement from upper to lower chambers—a 
process virtually nonexistent prior to the implementation of term limits” (Moncrief et al. 2004, 
370). 
Interestingly, Carey et al. (2006, 116) find that new legislators elected after the 
implementation of term limits “were more likely than any other group to have held elective 
public office prior to their election to the legislature.” Carey et al. tap into the strategic rationality 
camp in explaining this phenomenon: “with less assurance that state legislative office will be a 
continuing source of employment, those seeking such a career path require even more political 
ambition or self-confidence than before, and this trait is reflected in these individuals’ levels of 
prior officeholding.” Strategic rationality may influence the composition of legislative bodies in 
at least one other way by increasing “midsession vacancies because legislators who will be 
termed out take up other positions whenever suitable opportunities present themselves” 
(Moncrief et al. 2004, 361-362). 
2.2 Behavioral Effects 
 Clark and Williams (2014, 174) outline two theories that “offer distinct expectations for 
how legislators will behave once the ‘constraints’ imposed by elections are removed,” including 
through the implementation of term limits. The selection theory “suggests that legislators are 
chosen by the electorate precisely because of the positions they take and once in office, members 
adhere to their personal preferences which are a reflection of the constituents’ preferences” and 
that “the removal of electoral incentives or constraints [would not] significantly affect a 
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member’s behavior;” the sanctions theory “assumes that elections constrain legislators who 
otherwise are predisposed to shirk their duties to their constituents” and “that severing the 
electoral connection removes constraints and results in legislators acting as ‘free agents,’ 
shirking their duties to constituents.” As noted above, proponents of term limits argued that the 
reform would, paradoxically, result in both better representation for districts, somewhat in line 
with the selection theory, and more focus by legislators on the broader interest of the state and 
country—beyond the interests of individual districts—somewhat in line with the sanctions 
theory. 
Casual political observers would be right to assume that one of those outcomes would 
preclude the other from happening, and the research so far shows that it is the latter that has won 
out. In short, term limits seem to have “unfastened the electoral connection” (Sarbaugh-
Thompson and Thompson 2017, 72-73) between legislators and constituents but promoted an 
altered behavior that Carey et al. (2006, 123) call a “Burkean shift” away from the delegate 
model of representation toward the trustee model advocated by Edmund Burke in the 18th 
century: 
Legislators in term-limit states seem no less interested in reelection as long as they are eligible, 
and they spend equal time campaigning and fund-raising to non-term-limited legislators. Yet their 
interest in reelection does not manifest in an exclusive focus on district matters. Rather, according 
to their self-reports, they pay less attention to their constituents—whether one judges attention by 
constituency service or by pork barreling—and are more inclined to favor their own conscience 
and the interests of the state over those of the district 
This shift, promoted by legislators’ shortened time horizons imposed by term limits (Kousser 
2008, 122), manifests in term-limit state legislators “spending less time keeping in touch with 
constituents,” providing fewer constituent services, and working less to secure “government 
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money and projects for their districts” than legislators in non-term limit states (Carey et al. 2006, 
118-119). This erosion in electoral connection seems to be two-directional, as “respondents in 
states with term limits are less likely to be able to name their state legislators and contact these 
representatives less often than respondents in states without term limits” (Kousser 2008, 122). 
Legislators’ shifting attitudes toward their role of representative may be the primary 
behavioral change caused by term limits, as Carey et al. find term-limit state legislators report 
spending no less time reviewing and developing legislation and fundraising than their non-term-
limit state counterparts, and both groups of legislators report equal rates of policy specialization. 
Other studies find more shifts in legislative behavior after the implementation of term limits, 
though. The Moncrief and Thompson (2001, 404) survey of lobbyists found varied results from 
state to state, but lobbyists in some states reported that legislators introduce more legislation after 
term limits. Clark and Williams (2014, 186) found that “term limits may decrease the level of 
participation of members on floor votes,” although the effect seems to be different based on 
future electoral ambitions of term limited legislators and the visibility of the floor vote to the 
general public (171, 182-184). On procedural votes, members who were termed out but not 
seeking another elected office abstained at an 18% higher rate, while members who were 
voluntarily retiring abstained at only a 5% higher rate and termed out members running for 
another office abstained at no different rate (186). On final votes, members who were termed out 
but not seeking another elected office abstained at a 12% higher rate, while members who were 
voluntarily retiring from politics abstained at only a 4% higher rate. Interestingly, the study 
found that members termed out but running for another office abstained from final votes 16% 
more often, which the authors propose “may come from the increased demands associated with 
running for another office, or … from legislators’ reluctance to engage in position-taking for fear 
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that visible votes on controversial policies could be used against them in their next election.” It is 
worth noting that members voluntarily leaving in order to run for another office abstained at a 
7% higher rate. (185) 
Pairing these observations, particularly the patterns of termed out legislators focusing 
more on interests and positions more amicable with larger constituencies, with the conclusions 
made in Section 2.1 regarding strategic decision making, we can come to a sensible explanation; 
soon-to-be-term-limited officials seeking a move up the ladder would do well to take on 
positions favorable to the larger constituencies they may soon seek to represent. In fact, taking a 
closer look at term-limited legislators based on how many years they have remaining yields some 
interesting findings, as the behavioral tendencies discussed here seem to evolve as legislators’ 
time in office dwindles (Carey et al. 2006). 
2.3 Institutional Effects 
 Many term limits skeptics feared that increased legislative turnover brought on by term 
limits would weaken legislatures by distilling institutional knowledge. Once again, the evidence 
seems to support the opponents, despite the strategic cycling described above, and that has had 
profound effects on the structural operation of state governments. Straayer (2003, 66) 
summarizes the anecdotal arguments that are generally reinforced by empirical data: 
Ambitious new members pursue their own objectives knowing that their time is short, and that the 
consequences of bucking leaders are minimal since the leaders are or will soon be lame ducks. 
With experience and age, legislators tend to be more team oriented, but now they are younger and 
less experienced and disinclined to suppress their own desires for the good of the party caucus. 
Inexperienced leaders do not have time to learn and “digest” the rules and procedure; thus they 
are less adept at using rules strategically, and they are easier targets for obstructionists in the 
minority and in their own parties. General collegiality and team work suffer; fewer personal and 
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working relationships have time to develop and ambitious would-be leaders even within the same 
party fight for strategic advantage. Leadership contests are continuous. 
Perhaps one of the most important and well document changes resulting from term limits is the 
shift in institutional influence from the legislative branch to the executive branch, concentrating 
power in individual governors and executive bureaucracies with dwindling oversight (Cain and 
Kousser 2004, 72; Carey et al. 2006, 108, 124, 129-130; Kousser 2005, 169; Kousser 2008, 127; 
Moncrief and Thompson 2001, 401-402). Similarly, lobbyists, civil servants, institutional 
legislative staff, and even the media all seem to enjoy greater shares of power as term limits shift 
influence away from elected legislators due to diminished expertise and experience (Carey et al. 
2006, 124-125; Moncrief and Thompson 2001, 400-401), although, again, these findings can 
vary state to state (404). The effects rooted in legislator inexperience, however, can be mitigated 
by training programs, “selecting leaders in advance of their accession to power,” (Carey et al. 
2006, 108) and, in states that ban consecutive service and allow for cycling, the return of 
experienced members (Francis and Kenny 1997, 251). 
 While the inter branch shifts of influence seem to be well established, there is less clarity 
when it comes to intra branch shifts. Specifically, research has focused on whether parties and 
legislative leaders have lost power after the implementation of term limits. Carey et al. (2006, 
125-126) find weaker majority party leaders because their authority “is based on control over 
rewards and sanctions to rank-and-file legislators;” of course, if legislators know they are on the 
way out, they may feel more empowered to act independently (Clark and Williams 2014, 184). 
Kousser (2008, 122) says as “leaders have become less powerful, the traditional legislative 
process has begun to break down.” On the other hand, Cain & Kousser’s (2004, 53) case study of 
California found no diminished influence among legislative leaders. As with other subjects of 
their study, Moncrief and Thompson (2001, 404) again found the effect varied across states. 
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As noted previously and shown above, much of the existing literature focuses on term 
limits’ effects on state legislatures. Less research has been dedicated to understanding how 
proponents’ predictions regarding elections and citizen participation have played out. My 
exploration of that subject in Nebraska rests on an argument of political polarization. As such, I 
move next into an overview of how political polarization functions in the United States before 
proceeding to my analysis of Nebraska elections before and after term limits. 
 
CHAPTER 3: POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
A fire not to be quenched; it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, 
lest, instead of warming it should consume. 
-George Washington on Parties in his 1796 Farewell Address 
A quick Google search in April 2020 for “political polarization in the United States” 
yielded almost 9 million results. News articles on the topic abound. A 2019 New York Times 
opinion piece asked, “Is America hopelessly polarized?” (Klar et al. 2019) CNN claimed the 
same year that “polarization is poisoning America” (Avlon 2019). Even Foreign Affairs said 
“polarization runs deep” in the United States (Carothers and O'Donohue 2019). It is generally 
agreed that the political atmosphere in the United States is polarized. 
Political polarization, or at least intense political contempt, is not a new phenomenon in 
the United States. After all, Thomas Jefferson called his victory over John Adams in the 1800 
presidential race the “Revolution of 1800” (Ferling 2004, xi). Wood and Jordan (2017, 4) argue 
that polarization has largely been the norm since the early days of the Republic. Ansolabehere et 
al. (2001, 149) find political divergence as far back as the 1870s. Many scholars, though, believe 
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today’s polarized political atmosphere is rooted in the politics of the latter half of the 20th 
century (Fiorina 1999, 3-4, 6; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008, 542; Carson et al. 2007, 880; 
Fleisher and Bond 2004, 429). It is generally agreed that the polarization rooted in the 1960s and 
1970s, which can be largely traced to the Vietnam War and the disassembly of the one-party 
dominance seen throughout the middle of the 20th century (Wood and Jordan 2017, 7), has 
continued to grow during the 21st century (McCarty et al. 2016, 4; Bernhardt et al. 2008, 12). 
Strategies to “energize” or “fire up” parties’ bases, rather than those that target median voters, 
emerged in 1998 (Fiorina 1999, 2-3). Casual observers of American politics are likely to agree 
that these strategies have persisted. 
Merriam-Webster (2020) defines polarization as “concentration about opposing extremes 
of groups or interests formerly ranged on a continuum.” Polarization takes a number of forms in 
the political sphere. While I certainly could not be exhaustive in describing each, scholars have 
noted that the primary manifestation of a more polarized atmosphere has been found in more 
partisan and less cooperative legislative bodies, divided elites and activists, and diverging 
evaluations of parties (Layman and Carsey 2002, 786; Prior 2013, 102-103, 105). Many 
observers of the political system would also note increased contempt in what has become a 
virulent rancor of a public discourse in this country. 
Some scholars note that political polarization might not be an entirely bad phenomenon. 
For example, Abramowitz and Saunders (2008, 552) find that intense polarization regarding 
George W. Bush in the early 2000s contributed to high levels of engagement during the 2004 
election. “The greater the difference voters perceive between the candidates and parties, the 
greater their stake in the outcome and the more engaged they are likely to be.” Despite this, it is 
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not a controversial opinion that political polarization “has significant harmful effects” (Newport 
2019)—the net effect of polarization should not be described as good. 
With all that in mind, how exactly does political polarization occur? This is one of the 
great questions of contemporary American politics as pundits and citizens yearn for some 
nostalgic interpretation of bygone bipartisan eras. My review of the literature supports an 
untested theory that polarization is primarily a function of a 
unique triangle of influence playing out in all directions 
among the American public, political elites, and media 
institutions, with external forces—including political 
structures like term limits—providing one-way influences on 
the system. The American public exhibits polarized tendencies as the cues it receives from the 
media and elites become increasingly polarized. Elites become more polarized as the American 
public does in an effort to cater to voters’ demands to ensure reelection. The media becomes 
more polarized as the American public does in order to maximize their audiences and profits. 
And while there is less research showing the relationship between polarized elites and polarized 
media, existing literature suggests that the media can influence political elites by ensuring 
favorable coverage and elites can influence the media through “cozy relationships” or bribes—all 
resulting in a multi-directional, triangular relationship similar to Adams’ (1981) tested Iron 
Triangle, which describes the policymaking relationship among Congress, bureaucracies, and 
interest groups. 
3.1 Polarization of the American Public 
Prior (2013, 104) argues that, when analyzing polarization of the American public, “it is 
important to distinguish between attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors.” He implies that the 
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repercussions of each differ, but the purpose of this chapter is not to analyze how Americans are 
polarized but why — what facilitates and promotes polarization, no matter the form it takes. 
Even then, scholars disagree as to the extent of polarization among the American public. Some 
argue that today’s polarized populace is confined to a small segment of the public, perhaps those 
who are most politically engaged (Prior 2013, 106; Zaller 1992; Fiorina 1999, 18). Others argue 
that the public may not be polarized itself at all but rather simply appears polarized as a 
byproduct of its evaluation of a more polarized political class. However, because scholarship 
shows that even a small polarized “segment has disproportionate political influence” (Prior 2013, 
123), I move beyond establishing large scale polarization into discussing how polarization 
occurs. 
3.1.1 Cues 
 The most commonly used model to show how political opinions, including polarizing 
ones, seep into the citizenry is that of cueing. Others may refer to this mechanism as shortcuts or 
signaling games (Lupia 1994, 66). Downs (1957, 233) sums up the purpose of cueing as he notes 
that the average citizen “cannot be expert in all the fields of policy that are relevant to his 
decision. Therefore, he will seek assistance from men who are experts in those fields, have the 
same political goals he does, and have good judgment.” Downs is not the only scholar to note the 
utility of cueing (Gilens and Murakawa 2002, 15, 37; Hetherington 2001, 621). People may take 
cues based on the specific topic, type of issue, or position of cuer. Cues are likely to be taken 
when issues are new, complex, or require low levels of concern, or when recipients have low 
levels of knowledge or interest. (Gilens and Murakawa 2002, 19, 24, 29-30) Cuers can be a range 
of individuals, “including politicians and political officials, policy experts, interest groups, 
religious leaders, and journalists” and even sometimes personal acquaintances (Gilens and 
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Murakawa 2002, 16). Ultimately, it appears the most important prerequisite for a cuer is to have 
established an honest reputation, expertise, trust, or air of likability (Lupia 1994, 67; Sobel 1985, 
570; Brady and Sniderman 1985; Kuklinski et al. 1982, 618; Gilens and Murakawa 2002, 27, 
38). This is primarily due to the high cost members of the public incur from evaluating every 
individual potential cuer (Gilens and Murakawa 2002, 38). 
 However, as cue recipients begin to rely on preconceived notions in evaluating potential 
cuers, those cuers become adept at manipulating perceptions as a function of political leanings. 
Cues can be both persuasive or dissuasive, with the primary determinant being if the political 
leaning of the cuer matches that of the recipient (Gilens and Murakawa 2002, 26). Cue recipients 
tend to be adept at determining the like-mindedness of a potential cuer (Lupia 1994, 72; Brady 
and Sniderman 1985, 1061). 
3.1.2 Political Elites as Cuers 
 Research shows that elite polarization has an effect on mass polarization (Tucker et al. 
2018, 5; Hetherington 2001, 621, 623-624). This primarily results from diverging parties that 
clarify ideological positions (Prior 2013, 121; Hetherington 2001, 619; Abramowitz and 
Saunders 2008, 543). After all, political parties, which are led by political elites, tend to be better 
cuers than individuals, although as they become more heterogeneous, they become more difficult 
to associate with particular positions (Gilens and Murakawa 2002, 33). However, it seems party 
positions have become more homogenous in recent decades, and members of the public are able 
to interpret those positions on many issues as a single package (Layman and Carsey 2002, 788). 
Parties have an incentive to develop a “brand” of issues, but that comes “at the expense of 
diversity within parties” (Gilens and Murakawa 2002, 41). Recipients of cues, particularly those 
with strong party identifications, will adopt increasingly unidimensional positions in response to 
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stances taken by dissuasive, non-like minded cuers. (Gilens and Murakawa 2002, 26-27; Layman 
and Carsey 2002, 788). After all, party identification “powerfully organizes many other 
components of people’s belief systems” (Prior 2013, 106). 
Layman and Carsey (2002, 788) argue that most members of the public are unlikely to 
respond to cues from political elites “because they pay little attention to elite-level politics, 
because they have no ties or only weak ties to a political party, or both.” Gilens and Murakawa 
(2002, 33) make a similar point but argue that elite cues “might be a very important part of 
preference formation” for segments, potentially influential ones, of the public. Nevertheless, 
there is strong evidence to suggest cues play an important role in the American political process 
(Canes-Wrone et al. 2002, 130). For example, Kuklinski et al. (1982) show the role of cueing in 
the public’s opinion on nuclear energy, and Lupia (1994) shows its role in influencing voting 
behavior in California insurance reform elections. 
3.1.3 The Media as Cuers 
 There is strong evidence to suggest that the media influences the behavior of the 
American public, so one can understand how a polarized media could theoretically influence the 
public’s polarization. For example, Gerber et al. (2009, 48) conducted a study that found, among 
other things, that access to newspapers increased voter turnout in the 2006 national elections. 
Prior (2013) noted a study that found that increased media choice contributed to varying degrees 
of voter participation. Interestingly, this study found that cable expansion funneled unengaged 
citizens away from news broadcasts during primetime slots, which reduced the push on them to 
vote. Strömberg (2004, 192) wrote that “the media may even change the way people interact.” 
Even local newspapers can play an important role in influencing voters’ electoral calculus 
(Dalton et al. 1998, 111). 
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Studies have found that expanded media choice contributes to polarization (Prior 2007, 
247; Prior 2013, 107). For example, DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007, 1187-1189) found that the 
introduction of Fox News, an institution that leans farther to the right than most others 
(Groseclose and Milyo 2005, 1212), “had a significant impact on the 2000 elections” in favor of 
Republicans by inducing “a generalized ideological shift.” Prior (2013, 121) even finds an effect 
by cable news before the introduction of ideological outlets like Fox and MSNBC. Bernhardt et 
al. (2008, 20) point out that, theoretically, “voters could become completely informed even with 
two biased media by listening to both” but that “few voters are likely to take advantage of this 
opportunity because of a fundamental positive externality problem;” that is, there is an 
infinitesimal chance of casting a pivotal vote, especially compared to the small fraction of social 
benefits enjoyed by an individual voter. Voters are disincentivized from finding balance in the 
media and thus fall prey to biased media when they arise. This bias can manifest in a number of 
ways, including through media-annointed “experts” who have “a substantial impact on public 
opinion” as a result “of their actual or portrayed experience and expertise and nonpartisan status” 
(Page et al. 1987, 35). Relying on a small number of these “experts” or other official sources can 
transmit imbalance to the public (Gilens and Murakawa 2002, 42). 
 There are two models to show how a polarized media can affect the public: persuasion 
and selective exposure (Prior 2013, 108-111). The persuasive effect of a biased message 
primarily hinges on the recipient’s sophistication and preexisting attitudes. A slanted message 
can have a positive, neutral, or negative effect on a recipient; that is, the message can push the 
recipient’s views in line with that of the message, have no effect, or push the recipient’s views 
farther from that of the message. It really depends on the recipient’s ability to counter the 
message with other knowledge or the recipient’s recognition of the source. The selective 
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exposure model contends that recipients of media messages expose themselves primarily to 
outlets that are generally in line with their preexisting beliefs. 
3.2 Polarization of Political Elites 
“Members of Congress are generally assumed to act in response to pressures from their 
party, their constituents, and their own preferences” (Harbridge 2010, 2). As a result, it is fairly 
accepted that elite polarization reflects public polarization (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008, 
554). There are several mechanisms to explain this. 
3.2.1 Electoral Mechanisms 
 Many scholars agree that elite polarization primarily results from electoral considerations 
(Erikson 1971, 1032; Erikson and Wright 1980, 92, 96, 101; Canes-Wrone et al. 2002, 130). 
Research shows that polarization in legislative bodies results from replacement and conversion. 
Replacement describes how less ideological legislators tend to be succeeded by more ideological 
figures. Examples of this would include Tea Party candidates beating moderate Republicans in 
the 2010 primaries (Herszenhorn and Hulse 2010) or Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s defeat of 
Joseph Crawley in the 2018 primaries (Goldmacher and Martin 2018). Conversion describes the 
pressure incumbent legislators feel to adopt positions in line with their parties’ wings. (Fleisher 
and Bond 2004, 429; Carson et al. 2007, 881) “Partisan non-conformists disappeared mostly 
through replacement, as constituencies that once elected such members began to send 
mainstream partisans to Congress. The remaining non-conformists experience additional 
pressure as party leaders use their powers more aggressively to pursue a party agenda preferred 
by the more homogeneous party caucus.” (Fleisher and Bond 2004, 430) Internal homogeneity 
can be a result of electoral changes that create more homogeneous constituencies (431; Carson et 
al. 2007, 882). These electoral changes could result from gerrymandering (899) or the tendency 
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of citizens to “sort” into politically congenial geographic regions (Lang and Pearson-Merkowitz 
2015, 21). As legislative seats become safe, “constituency pressures may reinforce the effect of a 
member‘s party” (Harbridge 2010, 4). Fiorina (1999, 5) notes that “parties can be polarized 
across districts and/or within districts,” with both being uniquely important. Other scholars 
dismiss the role of districting in contributing to polarization (McCarty et al. 2016, 40). 
 Other research takes an entirely different perspective on the role of electoral 
considerations in contributing to elite polarization. Some scholars argue that electoral 
considerations actually incentivize elites to move toward the middle (Downs 1957; Erikson 
1971, 1018; Erikson and Wright 1980, 96; Wood and Jordan 2017, 9-10). Harbridge (2010) 
argues that polarization is a function of party popularity. Fiorina (1999, 18) believes party 
activists have a larger role to play than most voters due to their greater access to political elites. 
3.2.2 Media Mechanisms 
 The research showing how the media influences elite polarization relies primarily on its 
role as a conveyor of information between elites and the public. If elites are concerned about 
reelection, then they will seek to be covered favorably in the media, which is a primary channel 
of communication with their constituents (Strömberg 2004, 189). Research shows that elite 
behavior is affected by media saturation. Strömberg (2004, 215) found that state governors 
distributed more FERA funds in areas with greater access to radio in the 1930s. Besley and 
Burgess (2002, 1415) find similar government responsiveness in a separate case study. 
3.3 Polarization of the Media 
 Polarization of the media can be called a number of names, including bias (Bernhardt et 
al. 2008, 3) or slanting (Hayakawa and Hayakawa 1990, 30). It primarily manifests in explicit 
falsities or, perhaps more importantly, the suppression of certain facts (Groseclose and Milyo 
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2005, 1205). It “differs from reporting in that it deliberately or inadvertently makes certain 
judgements inescapable” (Hayakawa and Hayakawa 1990, 30). Baron (2006, 3-4) may have put 
it best: 
Bias takes a variety of forms. Bias could result from an absence of balance resulting in one side 
of a story receiving unwarranted attention. It could be ideological, where owners, editors, or 
journalists present stories that support particular world views. Bias could also be partisan, where 
owners, editors, and journalists present stories to support the policies or causes espoused by 
political parties or interest groups. Bias could also be due to the fabrication of information, from 
information hidden or distorted by sources, or from career concerns of journalists who compete to 
be published or be on the air. Bias could arise from the personal preferences of journalists, who 
may prefer not only that GMO foods be labeled but also that individuals take precautions against 
such foods. 
Scholars tend to disagree as to the level of polarization in the media. Dalton et al. (1998, 124) 
argue that it “is possible for the media to be both more neutral in their reporting of events and 
increasingly criticized by partisans for their (perceived) bias.” In fact, it is possible that unbiased 
coverage of polarizing figures can appear polarizing (Gilens and Murakawa 2002, 20). Prior 
(2013, 103) argues that “there is no evidence that longstanding outlets have become more 
partisan.” Dalton et al. (1998, 111) narrow Prior’s assessment to television as a result “of its 
history of government regulation, its origins in an advertising rather than a partisan culture, and 
its need to address a national viewership.” By any account, it is clear that new media forms 
contribute to increased polarization by allowing consumers to surround themselves with like-
minded thinkers. For example, Adamic and Glance (2005, 43) found that liberal and 
concersvative political blogs primarily link “within their separate communities, with far fewer 
cross-links exchanged between them.” Conover et al. (2011, 89) found that Twitter has “a highly 
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segregated partisan structure, with extremely limited connectivity between left- and right-leaning 
users.” There are two perspectives from which to derive polarization of the media: supply and 
demand. The supply perspective focuses on the influence of media industry professionals, and 
the demand perspective focuses on the influence of the audience. (Mullainathan and Shleifer 
2005, 1031) While this model does not explicitly mention the role of political elites, the literature 
suggests that elites may have an effect on both the supply and demand perspectives. I will start 
by reviewing the latter. 
3.3.1 Media Polarization as a Result of Demand 
People “accept, and many relish, a partisan press” because of its entertainment value 
(Posner 2005). This fact incentives profit-driven media entities to bend to the wants of its paying 
audience (Bernhardt et al. 2008, 1-2, 19; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010, 35; Baron 2006, 2). 
Because “audiences increase if the media outlet reports interesting information,” (Besley and 
Prat 2006, 721) media “tell stories that hang together and have a point of view” (Mullainathan 
and Shleifer 2005, 1031) since “any deviation from the coverage that maximizes audience means 
the loss of…advertising revenue” (Petrova 2011, 790). Some scholars argue that the concept of 
audience maximization encourages media entities to cast the widest net by aiming for the median 
consumer, but research simply shows this to not be the case. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010, 56) 
explicitly find “that in more Republican markets, newspapers adopt a more right-wing slant.” Ho 
and Quinn (2008, 364) rank several newspapers on how ideological they are. Their four most 
ideological papers “circulate nationally or in markets with multiple big papers” (Prior 2013, 
104). Media firms “slant their reports toward the prior beliefs of their customers in order to build 
a reputation for quality” (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006, 1). 
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Perhaps audience maximization has transitioned away from targeting the median 
consumer to targeting the polarized consumer as a function of increased competition. I quote 
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2002, 2005) extensively as they articulate this phenomenon better 
than a summary could do. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005, 1039) “suspect…that the growing 
partisanship of alternative media sources is a response to the growth in competition, and market 
segmentation, in the media” that has resulted from changes in media technology. They find that 
competition exaggerates media bias (1033) because it increases “the incentive to spin stories,” or 
create memorable stories (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2002, 1). “Competition forces newspapers 
to cater to the prejudices of their readers, and greater competition typically results in more 
aggressive catering to such prejudices as competitors strive to divide the market” (Mullainathan 
and Shleifer 2005, 1042). “The crucial determinant of accuracy is not competition, per se, but 
consumer heterogeneity” (1034), which “means that there is a distribution of reader beliefs,” 
including political beliefs (1035). “When readers are heterogeneous, the news received by the 
average reader might become even more biased as competitive media outlets segment the 
market” (1042). 
3.3.2 Media Polarization as a Result of Supply 
A smaller but still important field of scholarship examines how the professionals who 
work in the media industry contribute to media polarization themselves, although scholars do not 
agree on much. For example, some believe the media tends to be centrist as a result of the 
diverse perspectives of its various reporters (Prior 2013, 104; Dalton et al. 1998, 113), while 
others dismiss the role of media professionals in affecting media slant altogether (Gentzkow and 
Shapiro 2010, 38). Still others argue that journalists with career interests will do whatever it 
takes, including tolerating bias that increases profits, to advance (Baron 2006, 1-2). As noted 
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above, media entities desire to be known as credible and will provide confirmatory content to 
win over their audiences (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006, 29). Clearly, more research is needed on 
the supply side effect. It appears the audience has the much larger effect on determining media 
polarization. Supply and demand is not the only perspective from which to analyze media 
polarization, though. After all, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between 
political elites and media institutions. Let us review the limited scholarship that exists. 
3.3.3 Media Polarization as a Result of Elite Influence 
 Besley and Prat (2006, 721) outline the primary mechanism that elites might use to 
influence the media. “The government may influence news content by maintaining a ‘cozy’ 
relationship with the media.” These “cozy relationships” can result in “profits from collusion 
with the government,” also known as bribes. Bribes may be, in rare cases, direct monetary 
payments. In most cases, however, a bribe is a “subtle and indirect form of influence, such as an 
administrative decision or a legislative intervention that benefits a firm controlled by the media 
owner.” Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010, 62, 38), however, do not believe elites like members of 
Congress have a large role to play in media polarization. They “find no evidence that slant is 
related to the party affiliation of local elected officials.” Petrova (2011, 790) implies that growth 
of advertising revenue can make the media more independent from political influence. 
3.4 External Influences on the Triangle 
 The three actors identified in the Triangle of Polarization—the public, the media, and 
political elites—do not interact in a vacuum. Any number of external forces can impose a one-
way influence on the system, introducing, aggravating, or even mitigating polarization. Parties 
provide one example. Because parties offer significant benefits to elites (Smith 2007, 49), 
members are incentivized to toe the party line (Harbridge 2010, 3). Even congressional caucus 
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rules can have an effect on polarization (Cox and McCubbins 1994, 215). Fiorina (1999) 
provides an expansive review of other potential explanations for elite polarization. Wood and 
Jordan (2017, 6) argue that “party polarization in American history has always been rooted in 
economic class conflict.” Gerrymandering and money in politics, too, can influence the system 
(Barber et al. 2015). 
Indeed, the causes of political polarization have made for commonly researched topics, 
and many pages could be used to detail the suspected culprits. For present purposes, though, let 
us explore term limits as an influence; any impacts thereof best fit into the institutional effects 
prong of the tripartite organization by Carey et al. (2006, 106-107). Here, there are a range of 
scholarly opinions (Masket and Shor 2015, 72; Olson and Rogowski 2020, 572). Early research 
yielded “divided” conclusions on whether or not term limits contributed to political polarization 
(Straayer 2003, 69). As noted above in Section 2.1, the Carey et al. (2006, 114) survey of 
legislators found “no evidence at all that term limits changed the ideological makeup of 
legislatures.” However, the Moncrief and Thompson (2001, 402) survey of lobbyists found 
candidates for legislature “were more ideological than candidates prior to term limits;” it seems 
that legislators say polarization is no different as a result of term limits, whereas outside 
observers disagree. Kousser (2008, 122) found “that partisan conflict—which was already strong 
in most states—has sharpened as term limits have erased legislators’ common pasts and shared 
futures.” On the other hand, a Cain and Kousser (2004, 70) study of California found that “term 
limits are not to blame” for increasing polarization and, in some cases, may even moderate what 
they found to be a tendency among legislators to drift toward political extremes over the course 
of a political career; Wright (2007, 268) also found little influence on polarization by term limits. 
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 Olson and Rogowski (2020) provide one of the most contemporary examinations of the 
subject, and they take particular issue with the generalizability of Wright’s conclusions 
specifically (573). Olson and Rogowski outline two mechanisms by which term limits may 
promote political polarization (574): “First, at the individual level, term limits reduce the 
incentives for legislators to learn about and respond to the interests of their constituents.” 
Second, because “the diminished opportunities for career advancement in term-limited 
legislatures dissuade otherwise-qualified potential candidates from seeking office[,] … parties 
expend greater effort to recruit potential candidates and favor candidates with stronger 
ideological views whose support for the party program is more assured.” Other scholars have 
outlined possible alternative mechanisms, including that, conversely from Wright’s finding 
above, politicians enter office with polarized tendencies but drift toward the middle with more 
time in office, time which is cut short by the introduction of term limits; that the shorter terms 
guaranteed by term limits are naturally more attractive to ideologues; that shorter tenures 
encourage elected officials to “generally stick with their caucuses in their first terms and over 
their brief careers” (Cain and Kousser 2004, 63-64); and that the turnover resulting from term 
limits empowers partisan actors to recruit more beholden candidates (Masket and Shor 2015, 72) 
 The Olson and Rogowski (2020) study lends support for both of their identified 
mechanisms. They have three key findings (577): 
First, overall, legislative terms limits are associated with statistically and substantively important 
increases in party polarization. Second, these effects are stronger in states’ lower chambers; and, 
third, these patterns appear to be driven disproportionately by greater movement by Republican 
legislators in the ideologically extreme direction. 
As noted above, the effects of term limits can come in two stages—one upon enactment and the 
other upon implementation—and the authors here found two stages of influence on political 
38 
polarization, as well (580). They also alluded to some mixed results (581) based on the degree of 
professionalization of the legislature, although they conclude that polarization as a result of term 
limits is more pronounced in more professional legislatures (575). 
Conveniently, some studies have taken a particular interest in the state of Nebraska as an 
officially nonpartisan legislature; existing work by Masket and Shor (2015) establishes that term 
limits have indeed contributed to greater polarization in the Unicameral. In fact, the authors write 
that the Nebraska Unicameral is polarizing “more rapidly than any other state or federal 
legislative chamber in the nation” (69) and that “partisanship has returned to Nebraska with a 
vengeance” (86). The authors use interviews with contemporary Nebraska political actors and 
campaign finance records to “find that newly instituted term limits created opportunities for the 
state’s political parties to recruit and finance candidates in an increasingly partisan fashion” 
(Masket and Shor 2015, 69). The authors proceed (86): 
The forced retirement of a large segment of the legislature in 2006 due to term limits spurred the 
parties and the governor into action, recruiting, training, and funding candidates at levels not 
previously seen in modern Nebraska. The state’s new legislators are increasingly being chosen for 
their expected adherence to party agendas, as determined by party leaders and the governor. And 
the donation patterns of elite campaign contributors are increasingly following a partisan and 
ideological pattern, suggesting that to the extent that legislators want to keep their donors happy, 
they will do so by voting more with their party. 
Masket and Shor find that partisanship, as measured by “Shor–McCarty (2014) common space 
roll call data,” increases the most and continues increasing exactly upon the implementation of 
term limits (76). Masket and Shor emphasize the recruiting role of the Nebraska governor at that 
time, Dave Heineman. They write that Heineman’s “atypical” professional history as “a former 
executive director of the state’s Republican Party” makes him “seen as an exceptionally partisan 
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creature with a hands-on approach to politicking” (74), although the chairman of Nebraska’s 
Democratic Party also saw “a unique opportunity for aggressive recruitment” (73). These 
findings are in line with the Moncrief and Thompson (2001, 402) survey of lobbyists that found 
increasing partisanship due to evolving recruitment practices post-term limits. 
— 
Having explored how political polarization functions in the United States, including as a 
result of term limits, and having established the effect of increased political polarization due to 
term limits in Nebraska, I proceed now to my analysis of electoral competition and voter 
behavior post-term limits in the state. 
 
CHAPTER 4: TERM LIMITS AND TURNOUT 
“Every election is determined by the people who show up.” 
-Larry Sabato 
It’s a fundamental question of democracy: what makes voters tick? Few questions strike 
closer to the core of democratic principles. In a system of government that relies on citizen 
participation, understanding the range of influences on civic behavior can unlock strategies to 
promote democratic ideals. However, any study of human behavior is as complex as the subjects 
themselves, and efforts to understand the minds of voters are challenging at best. Voter behavior 
is an incredibly malleable, complex phenomenon. One might expect decision making at the polls 
to be rooted in a voter’s alignment with any given candidate’s political positions; while that 
certainly plays a role in a voter’s choice on whom to support for office (and how, when, and 
where to support them), something as peripheral as a candidate’s vocal pitch can play a role, too 
(Tigue 2012). It is against this backdrop that I turn now to the primary purpose of this paper: an 
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examination of the effect of term limits on electoral competition and voter behavior. If a 
politician’s timbre can influence a voter’s decision, it is not entirely out of the realm of 
possibility that so too could such a significant shift in a political system’s structure. 
4.1 The Rationality of Voting 
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) theorize that voter behavior—specifically, a voter’s decision 
to either head to the polls or stay home on election day—can be modeled as a rational act in the 
following equation: 
R = BP - C + D 
R is defined as the reward that a person receives from voting. When R > 0, it is rational for a 
person to vote, and the person will cast a ballot in an election. When R ≤ 0, voting is an irrational 
act, and the person will not cast a ballot. B is defined as the differential benefit the potential voter 
would gain from the success of his or her preferred candidate over other candidates. P is defined 
as the probability that the potential voter would cast the deciding vote in an election to bring 
about that differential benefit. C is defined as the cost a potential voter would incur from the act 
of voting. D is defined as the satisfaction the potential voter would gain as a result of voting 
based upon societal norms and attitudes toward voting. This can also be referred to as the “civic 
duty” one feels to cast a ballot. 
 Certainly, any number of political realities could have a range of effects on each of these 
terms, including any increase in electoral competition derived from the implementation of term 
limits as proponents predicted would occur. At this juncture, it is worth noting that electoral 
competition can take any number of forms and be measured in a variety of ways—strength of 
candidates, number of candidates, campaign finance data, and electoral victory margins, to name 
just a few. Here, I speak of electoral competition in a general and encompassing sense of the 
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degree to which an election is contested. Indeed, the literature shows that several causal 
mechanisms can link electoral competition to a greater rationality in voting. For example, 
electoral competition can reduce the cost C of voting through at least two ways: first, the more 
competitive an election is, the more likely it is to generate interest and produce significant 
amounts of accessible information (Holbrook and Van Dunk, 1993), which makes it easier and 
less costly for a voter to inform themselves on the choices they’ll face at the polls. Second, party 
organizations have an incentive to make the voting process easier in a competitive election for 
their voters by reducing the costs C of voting (Powell 1986). This can be done a number of ways, 
including by making information more easily attainable and by transporting voters to election 
sites. Competitive elections can also spur greater interest in voting as a voter becomes more 
likely to have a greater individual impact (Rausch 1998, 42); this effect could be reflected in 
either or both of the probability P or satisfaction D variables. 
4.2 Term Limits and Electoral Competition 
If electoral competition can increase voter turnout, and if term limits live up to the 
prediction that they can promote increased electoral competition, then a logical chain exists to 
show that term limits can promote greater voter turnout. Assuming the former is supported by the 
literature described above, I turn to an examination of the latter. As noted previously, some 
research has been conducted to test claims that term limits promote electoral competition and 
participation but has yielded mixed conclusions, sometimes even within individual studies (see 
Olson and Rogowski 2020 and Rausch 1998). 
 Kousser (2008, 117) found that the average margin of victory in state legislative races in 
term limit states did not change after the implementation of term limits; Olson and Rogowski 
(2020, 583) called the effects of term limits on electoral competition “negligible.” One study of 
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the Board of Supervisors of San Mateo County, California, which has been subject to term limits 
since 1980, found no change in the number of candidates running for office (Rausch 1998, 43); 
Rausch (50) goes on to propose that the implementation of term limits can actually decrease 
electoral competition. 
 On the other hand, some early studies provided preliminary evidence that elections do 
become more competitive after the implementation of term limits (Petracca 1996, 19; Moncrief 
and Thompson 2001, 397). Armor (1993, 15) finds that increased electoral competition in term 
limit states extends even to races where an incumbent is not term limited. Olson and Rogowski 
(2020, 583) suggest that effects on electoral competition can be more pronounced the more 
professional a legislature is, and Rausch (1998, 42) says “that by limiting the number of times 
incumbents may seek reelection, states may experience more competitive primary and general 
elections for legislative seats.” 
 Research on term limits’ effects on electoral competition has also dialed in on an 
interesting niche that parallels the strategic rationality described in Chapter 2. Just as elected 
politicians may strategically decide to run for another position as their term nears its end but 
before being forced out by term limits, so too may prospective candidates strategically decide to 
sit out an election if an official is close to being term limited in order to wait to run for a vacant 
seat (Rogers 2014; Rausch 1998, 47). Rogers’ (2014, 23) findings 
suggest that the electoral competition within term limit states varies depending on how close state 
legislators are to being forced from office. Incumbents in term limit states face fewer but stronger 
challengers early in their career. However as they approach their term limit, the opposition they 
face has smaller campaign war chests and performs more poorly at the ballot box. 
Alternatively, term limits could theoretically promote greater electoral competition as officials 
near their limits by encouraging candidates to run against the incumbent in the incumbent’s final 
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election in an effort to build name recognition for a prospective run for the vacant seat in the next 
cycle (Armor 1993, 16; Rausch 1998, 44). 
4.3 The Nebraska Theory 
 Despite these varied findings, I explore the effects of term limits on voter behavior in 
Nebraska with confidence that an effect can be found because of one x factor: political 
polarization. As shown above, term limits have directly contributed to an increase in political 
polarization in Nebraska, at least among political elites. Assuming the Triangle of Polarization 
adequately models how polarization contaminates a political system, an increase in polarization 
among elites would eventually contribute to an increase in polarization among the general 
citizenry. How, though, does political polarization relate to the present discussion on voter 
turnout? 
Just as electoral competition can influence the rationality of voting, so too can political 
polarization by increasing the differential benefit B term. Abramowitz and Saunders (2008) use 
the 2004 U.S. presidential election as a case study to show that polarization can actually energize 
civic engagement. They show that, controlling for other factors, intensity of feeling toward 
George W. Bush had a significant influence on voter turnout; that is, the more a potential voter 
liked or disliked the incumbent, the more likely the person was to turn out at the polls. The 
authors’ logic rests on the notion that the greater the difference between two candidates, the 
greater the stake one feels in the outcome of the election. Abramowitz (2010, 5) describes that 
these higher stakes can contribute to an increase in a range of political activities, including voting 
but also in “talking about politics with friends and neighbors, displaying yard signs and bumper 
stickers, and giving money to political parties and candidates.” Rogowski (2014, 480) calls this 
the mobilization hypothesis, but it is worth noting that he subscribes to and finds evidence to 
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support what he terms the demobilization hypothesis; that is, that polarization reduces 
participation. Despite this discrepancy, I will assume that the mobilization hypothesis is correct 
for present purposes. 
In short, term limits have contributed to increased political polarization in Nebraska. 
Theoretical models predict that this should, in turn, increase voter turnout by making voting a 
more rational act through increased stakes for voters. This theory does come into conflict with 
Nalder’s (2007) findings in a study of California state legislative races from 1976 to 2004 that 
term limits decrease voter turnout. Nevertheless, I hypothesize the following: 
H1:  Nebraska state legislative elections after the enactment and/or implementation of term 
limits will be more competitive than legislative elections before their enactment and/or 
implementation. 
H2: Voter turnout will increase after the enactment and/or implementation of term limits. 
Let us turn now to an analysis of these hypotheses. 
 
CHAPTER 5: UNDERSTANDING THE UNICAM 
“Follow the evidence to where it leads, even if the conclusion is uncomfortable.” 
-Author Steven James 
As noted above, electoral competition can be spoken of in a general and encompassing 
sense of the degree to which an election is contested, and it can be measured a number of ways 
through strength of candidates, number of candidates, campaign finance data, and electoral 
victory margins. I will first explore some of these measures of electoral competition in Nebraska 
pre- and post-term limits using descriptive statistics and regression analyses before concluding 
with a brief look at any effects of term limits on voter turnout. 
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5.1 The Data 
Nearly all data used here comes from the Nebraska Secretary of State’s (SOS) website, 
which hosts books of certified primary and general election results going back to 1916. A 
plethora of data is available, with party registration numbers and final vote tallies for candidates 
down to the county level. However, I have chosen to draw from the available data, using a year-
state legislative district as my unit of analysis, four key variables: the margin of victory between 
the winning candidate’s percentage of total votes over the losing candidate’s percentage of total 
votes, the number of candidates running in the primary election, whether or not the incumbent 
senator was running, and, in races where the incumbent was running, whether or not the 
incumbent won. This data has been collected between the years 1980 and 2020. There are two 
reasons for this. First, there have been about 20 years since term limits in Nebraska were passed 
in 2000, so it felt appropriate to compare the 20 years since to the 20 or so years before. Second, 
as noted above, scholars have documented declining rates of legislative turnover in the second 
half of the 20th century; seeing as the term limits phenomenon is so closely linked to 
incumbency advantage, it felt inappropriate to reach too far into the past for results coming 
before that documented decline. 
In a handful of year-districts, this data had to be pulled from external, unofficial sources. 
For example, the Nebraska SOS did not report primary election results for special elections in 
2002, meaning an official number of primary candidates for those races could not be discerned. 
In other instances, pages of old canvass books that had been scanned were missing, and the 
scanned results of the 1988 election left the vote tallies entirely illegible. Almost all of these 
challenges were rectified using sources like the Nebraska Blue Book, old reports in the Lincoln 
Journal Star and the Daily Nebraskan, Ballotpedia, Wikipedia (in a few desperate cases to 
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crosscheck the dates of incumbency of some relatively prominent Nebraska legislators), the 
Washington County Genealogical Society, and, in one case, even a 2006 obituary published in 
the Anderson, Indiana, Herald Bulletin. I will point out where data could not be recovered at the 
relevant junctures below. 
There are three points about the data that should be made here, though. First, the margin 
of victory variable, as just noted, is measured using the winning candidate’s percentage of total 
votes over the losing candidate’s percentage of total votes. The Nebraska SOS, around the turn 
of the century, stopped reporting (in most cases) the number of write-in votes for each race. 
Where official write-in vote totals were provided, the margin of victory was calculated with 
write-in votes counting toward the total number of votes cast; if write-in votes were not reported, 
then the total number of votes was calculated just by adding the total votes received by each 
general election candidate.  
Second, Nebraska’s non-partisan system provides for any number of candidates to run in 
the primary election for state legislative races, with the two candidates receiving the most votes 
proceeding to the general election. This is why I have chosen to use the number of primary 
candidates as the metric to measure electoral competition as a function of the number of 
candidates running.  
Finally, incumbency status, for nearly every year-district, was determined simply by 
comparing the list of primary candidates to the name of the victorious candidate in the 
immediately preceding race. If the incumbent was running in the primary election, no matter 
whether the candidate made it to the general election, the race was coded as having an incumbent 
running. There were a handful of cases where redistricting complicated this coding. In 1994, W. 
Owen Elmer ran for and won district 44 against a non-incumbent after having won election from 
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district 38 in 1990 and 1986. In 2002, Douglas D. Cunningham ran for and won district 40 in 
2002 after having won a 2000 special election for district 18; Cunningham’s 2002 victory came 
against incumbent Cap Dierks. Incumbency status, then, was based on the specific district 
number rather than general membership of the legislature. So, the 1994 district 44 race was 
coded as no incumbent running, and the 2002 district 40 race was coded as an incumbent loss. 
5.2 Descriptive Analysis of Term Limits Effects’ on Electoral Competition in the Unicam 
 While simple analyses of this data using descriptive statistics may not carry the scientific 
certainty required to causally link term limits and trends, the trends found, if any, can illuminate 
the context of our discussion and provide areas of future inquiry. The data I have collected can 
provide insight into three forms of electoral competition: the number of candidates running, the 
rates at which incumbents seek reelection, and the rates at which incumbents are reelected. 
 Figure 2 shows the average number of primary candidates per year between 1980 and 
2020. The year 1986 is not included because the Nebraska SOS’ scan of the 1986 primary 
canvass book was missing the page(s) that had results for eight of the 24 races that year, and no 
online sources could be found that included the number of primary candidates for those races. 
Further, 2002 is not a pure 
representation of the true state 
of that year as no primary 
election data could be found 
for the 2002 district 49 special 
election; however, 26 of the 
27 races that year were 
included in the calculation. 
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There is little that can be deduced from Figure 2. Since 1980, there has generally been between 
two and three primary candidates running for each district. Obviously, there are outliers, like 
1992’s 3.68 candidates per race, and 2006’s 1.73 candidates per race. Interestingly, 2006 was the 
year in which term limits took effect in Nebraska. Any long-serving incumbents who hadn’t 
prematurely retired or moved on would have been forced from office in this year (and 2008), and 
conventional wisdom would expect any anomalous uptick in open seats to precipitate an influx 
of primary candidates vying for more open seats. As Figure 3 shows, there was certainly an 
anomalous uptick in open races, with only 5.88% of incumbents running for reelection, yet there 
were fewer primary candidates on average than any other year in the 40-year span. Since 2008, 
there have generally been more primary candidates on average than 1994 to 2008, although that 
number declined throughout the 2010s. 
 Figure 3 shows the percentage of races with an incumbent running for reelection in each 
election between 1980 and 2020. The year 1986, again, must be qualified; two of the 24 races 
were removed from the dataset because incumbency data could not be determined. Incumbency 
advantage is a well-documented phenomenon in political science, so when more incumbents are 
running for reelection, the 
general atmosphere of an 
election can be described as 
less competitive; it is less 
possible for a non-incumbent 
candidate to mount a serious 
challenge here. So, where 
points are high on this chart, 
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races might generally be described as less competitive, and where points are low as generally 
more competitive. Of course, this is an imperfect assumption, as the case of 2006 in Figure 2 
illustrates. That aside, though, what is striking in Figure 3 is the relative stability of the number 
of incumbents running for reelection before the term limits movement picked up steam in the 
1990s compared to the chaos of the 2000s, which have been defined by large swings in the 
number of incumbents running for reelection each year. While Figure 4 and not Figure 3 deals 
more closely with turnover rates, Figure 3 reminds us of Francis and Kenny’s (1997, 247) 
prediction described above of oscillating turnover rates that eventually converge to the pre-
existing equilibrium. Indeed, races since 2016 seem to have stabilized, but this is a trend that 
should be monitored in the coming years. 
 Finally, Figure 4 represents incumbency advantage by showing the percentage of running 
incumbents who win reelection each year. Again, 1986 must be qualified as two of the 24 races 
have been removed. The most important take-away from Figure 4 is that term limits do not seem 
to have had much of an effect, if any, on incumbency advantage in Nebraska state legislative 
races. Save for two dips in 1992 and 2016, incumbents have been reelected more than 73% of the 
time they are running since 
1980 – and usually more than 
80% of the time. Of course, to 
be properly understood, these 
findings must be read in 
conjunction with the variance 
in incumbents running 
represented in Figure 3. 
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5.3 Regression Analysis of Term Limits Effects’ on Electoral Competition in the Unicam 
 As noted, the descriptive statistics discussed above shine light on trends in Nebraska 
politics before and after term limits, but they cannot lend scientific support to any causation from 
term limits themselves. Let’s turn now to the final competition data collected from the Nebraska 
SOS with that in mind: margins of victory. Of course, margins of victory make for one of the 
best measures of electoral competition. As margins become smaller, elections are, by definition, 
more competitive, and vice versa. 
 Here, I introduce one more variable into consideration: political polarization. Because the 
entire Nebraska Theory rests on political polarization, it will be important to control in any 
regression for the effects of political polarization. In order to do so, I use Shor and McCarty’s oft 
cited Aggregate State Legislator Ideology Data (2020). Specifically, I use their scores that 
measure the average ideological distance between any two members in the Unicam for a given 
year. While their “preferred measure of polarization” is the score that measures the distance 
between party median ideological scores in a given chamber, I have opted to not use this because 
of the Unicam’s official nonpartisanship. 
Shor and McCarty provide data only for 1992 though 2018, rendering useless the data for 
1980 through 1990 and 2020. Therefore, I will run two sets of regressions: one for the entire 
dataset that cannot be controlled for polarization, and one for a subsection of the dataset that can 
be controlled. These two sets can be further divided into four total, though, as I will test whether 
victory of margin varies on if term limits have been enacted (i.e., passed in 2000), as well as if 
term limits have been implemented (i.e., carry legal weight to prevent candidates from running, 
beginning in 2006/2008) in each set, leaving me with four models. In each, I will control for 
various combinations of three variables (four in the polarization sets): whether the election is a 
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presidential election, the number of primary candidates running for the seat, and whether an 
incumbent is running for reelection. This last variable is particularly important to control for, as 
incumbency advantage was one of the main arguments catalyzing the term limits movement.  
All races that took place in 1988 have been omitted from these models due to the 
illegibility of the Nebraska SOS’ scans; no reported results could be found elsewhere on the 
Internet. Year-districts 1986-18, -20, -22, -24, -26, -28, -30, -32, and 2002-49 have been omitted 










 The results in Tables 2 and 4 can be immediately dispensed with; no statistically 
significant results came from regressions testing whether margin of victory varied on whether or 
not term limits were enacted, save for two minorly significant results of the 16 tested in Table 4. 
Juxtaposing this to the many statistically significant findings in Tables 3 and 5 shows that 
whether term limits have been implemented matters much more than whether they have been 
enacted. It was discussed above in Chapter 2 that the effects of term limits may come in two 
waves: first with their passage and second with their implementation. These findings tend to 
undermine that argument.  
 While there is a plethora of findings that could be discussed, column 8 in Table 3 and 
column 16 in Table 5 are the most important, as both control for all confounding variables in 
their respective datasets. Table 3 shows a statistically significant finding at the 95th percentile 
confidence level that the implementation of term limits is related to a 5.4 percentage point 
reduction in margins of victory; in other words, races after the implementation of term limits, 
when controlling for presidential election years, the number of candidates vying for a seat, and 
whether an incumbent is running, are 5.4 percentage points closer than races before the 
implementation of term limits. 
 While this seems to be a very important finding indeed, Table 5 tempers that a bit. When 
controlling for political polarization, in addition to the other confounding variables in the model, 
no statistically significant result could be found. However, this discrepancy could very well be 
due to having fewer year-districts included. Indeed, there are five fewer years preceding the 
implementation of term limits and one fewer year following their implementation in the Table 5 
model than there is in the Table 3 model. It can’t be said for certain what would happen if we 
were to have polarization scores for those years. It seems, in typical fashion for research on term 
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limits, that the results are mixed and inconclusive. Nevertheless, the statistically significant 
findings in Tables 2 and 4 are all negative, meaning the margins of victory have shrunk and that 
races have become more competitive since the implementation of term limits in Nebraska. This 
aligns with my theory and hypothesis that term limits would increase the competition in state 
legislative elections. 
5.4 Term Limits and Turnout in Nebraska 
 Having found mild support for the electoral competition hypothesis, let us know finally 
turn to a look at voter turnout trends in Nebraska. Riker and Ordeshook’s (1968) model predicts 
that both the political polarization documented by Masket and Shor (2015) and the increased 
electoral competition documented in Section 5.3 stemming from term limits should promote 
greater voter turnout. Indeed, Figures 5 and 6 reflect a shift in the trends of voter turnout since 
1968. Voter turnout statistics were collected 
from the Nebraska SOS. The year 1968 was 
chosen as a cut off because of a change in voter 
registration practices in 1967. Voter turnout was 
calculated as the total number of votes cast in an 
election divided by the total number of registered 
voters. It is striking to see that voter turnout has 
historically trended downward since 1968, but 
that trend has reversed direction since term limits 
were enacted in 2000. Again, Riker and 
Ordeshook’s (1968) model showcases how the 
decision of a citizen to head to the polls is 
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complicated and complex, and the existence of one political convention like term limits would 
never singularly determine if a potential voter became an actual voter. Any number of causes 
could have influenced a shift in voter turnout trends, and these findings do not scientifically 
conclude that term limits have led to increased voter turnout, but they do illustrate the context in 
which a change in one political reality has coincided with a change in another. 
  
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
“A journey of a thousand miles begins with one step.” 
 -Lao Tzu 
 Term limits have made for one of the most dramatic and fascinating evolutions in state 
governance over the last quarter century. Term limits are not novel experiments, but the 
swiftness of the reform movement of the 90s certainly was. In Brandeisian fashion, the state 
laboratories, each with a slightly different flavor of term limit policy, have yielded interesting 
findings to either support or undermine the many predictions made by both sides of the debate in 
the 1990s as outlined in Chapter 1. The purpose of this paper has been to examine Nebraska as a 
case study to understand if and how term limits have affected political actors outside the 
legislature, and interesting findings were made indeed. 
 This paper has posited the argument that term limits can influence voter turnout through 
at least two mechanisms: an increase in political polarization and an increase in electoral 
competition, both of which may promote greater citizen participation. Along the way, I have 
outlined the history of term limits, catalogued existing research on their effects, and developed a 
novel theory to describe how political polarization operates in the United States. Perhaps most 
importantly, though, I have examined electoral competition in Nebraska state legislative races 
since 1980 through a number of lenses. My most important findings have included that: 
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1. Incumbency advantage has not changed much since 1980; 
2. The number of candidates running for office has not changed much since 1980; 
3. The implementation of terms limits seems to have a greater effect on electoral 
competition than does their mere enactment; and, 
4. The implementation of term limits tends to promote more competitive elections, at least 
when measured by margins of victory. 
Perhaps the most unique contribution of this paper, though, is the consolidated summary of a 
number of measures of electoral competition in Nebraska legislative elections since 1980. 
 In the future, scholars would do well to make similar inventories of electoral competition 
in other term limit states. Such a comparative approach would allow for the examination of how 
political culture may impact how the effects of term limits manifest. Obviously, the unique status 
of Nebraska as having the only non-partisan, unicameral legislature in the United States has 
made many of these findings specific to the state, but the findings illuminate threads to be 
pursued elsewhere. Also, a more robust scientific examination should be made to see if there is 
any direct causal link between term limits and the shift in voter turnout trends identified in 
Chapter 5. 
 In the meantime, the Nebraska experiment with term limits continues. As recently as 
November 2018, voters in Nebraska – at least, in specific areas of Nebraska – have continued to 
consider the question of term limits (Hicks 2019). Residents of Lincoln, the state’s second-
largest city, approved a three consecutive term limit for the city’s mayor, which forced Mayor 
Chris Beutler to step back from seeking reelection for a fourth term. 
 As term limits continue to evolve and become enacted, much more can be learned about 
their institutional effects. Trends must be continually re-examined, and state-by-state differences 
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should be investigated. It is hoped that that journey of a thousand miles has been adequately 
supported with this paper’s one step forward. 
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mydata_p <-read.csv("Regression Unicam Data POLARIZED.csv") 
y <-mydata_p$per_dif 
x1 <-mydata_p$term_enact 
x2 <-mydata_p$term_impl 
z1<-mydata_p$prim_can 
z2<-mydata_p$pres_election 
z3<-mydata_p$inc_run 
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z4<-mydata_p$polarization 
 
p_enact<- lm(y~x1) 
 
p_enact_prim<-lm(y~x1+z1) 
p_enact_pres<-lm(y~x1+z2) 
p_enact_inc<-lm(y~x1+z3) 
p_enact_pol<-lm(y~x1+z4) 
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